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‘‘Passing through the Mirror’’:
Dead Man, Legal Pluralism and the
De-territorialization of the West

Ruth M. Buchanan
Osgoode Hall Law School,York University

Abstract
The failures of Western law in its encounter with indigenous legal orders have been well
documented, but alternative modes of negotiating the encounter remain under-explored in legal
scholarship. The present article addresses this lacuna. It proceeds from the premise that the
journey towards a different conceptualization of law might be fruitfully re-routed through the
affect-laden realm of embodied experience – the experience of watching the subversive antiwestern film Dead Man. Section II explains and develops a Deleuzian approach to law and film
which involves thinking about film as ‘‘event.’’ Section III considers Dead Man’s relation to the
western genre and its implications for how we think about law’s founding on the frontier. Finally,
the article explores the concept of ‘‘becoming’’ through a consideration of the relationship
between the onscreen journey of the character Bill Blake and the radical worldview of his
poetic namesake.
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I. Introduction: Two Turns
This article is situated within unfolding debates in legal and constitutional theory,
in sympathy with those who have called on legal scholars to endeavor to develop new
ways of thinking about law in agonistic and pluralist terms. The demands of an
increasingly diverse public articulated through a dizzying array of democratic
practices at both the national and international levels would seem to require no less
than a robust theory and practice of legal pluralism.1 Yet, much of our contemporary
legal theorizing, bound to the form of the modern state and to a dualist cognitive
framework dominated by a disembodied rationality, is ill-suited to this task. In
contrast, this paper will argue that the journey towards a different conceptualization
of law might be fruitfully re-routed through the affect-laden realm of embodied
experience – here the experience of watching a particular film.
Recently, following the insight that sensibilities and cultural forms drive larger
political formations, there has been a ‘‘turn to affect’’ in social and political theory.2
This turn brings with it a related attentiveness to the analysis of a variety of cultural forms,
including film. The experience of ‘‘watching’’ a film can mobilize an array of affective
responses in us. We are moved by films, often in ways that may belie or betray our
cognitive understandings. Films have, then, the capacity to shape our sensibilities,
either to align them with dominant formations, or to swerve us toward emergent or
alternative possibilities. Or, to use the Deleuzian language, films might function
either as de-territorializing or re-territorializing assemblages.3 To the extent that a
film works as a de-territorializing assemblage, it can open up a line of flight towards

multiple possibilities for becoming otherwise, including other ways of becoming legal
subjects.
Dead Man is one such film. Written and directed by independent American
filmmaker Jim Jarmusch, it is nominally a ‘‘western’’ – it is set sometime in the 1870’s,
and its action (shot in a richly textured black and white) moves in a westerly
direction through a variety of wilderness landscapes that lie between two small
settlements, the frontier town of Machine and a Makah village located on the
western edge of the Olympic peninsula in Washington State. The minimalist plot of
the film is set in motion by the arrival in Machine of a naïve young accountant from
Cleveland, William Blake, played by Johnny Depp. Blake soon discovers that the letter
of employment which had prompted his journey west was ‘‘not worth the paper it was
written on,’’ invoking the western’s classic pre-occupation with the potency of law on
the frontier.4 Blake somewhat accidentally becomes involved in a love triangle
involving the film’s only speaking female character, Thel. When Thel is shot by her
jilted lover (played by Gabriel Byrne) the bullet passes through her and lodges in
Blake’s chest, next to his heart. Blake, who is without his glasses, then shoots, and
shoots, and shoots again, eventually killing the character of Byrne, the son of the
factory owner [Dickinson] Blake had encountered the previous day. Blake thus becomes
an outlaw with a bounty on his head. The remainder of the film traces Blake’s journey
to the coast, accompanied by an indigenous character named Nobody (played by Gary
Farmer) and pursued by numerous bounty hunters. Almost everything about this film is
strange and disorienting – its tone, its settings, the edits, and the remarkable improvised
score by Neil Young all work together to dislocate the viewer in both time and space.

Dead Man is not an easy film to watch, and its subject matter as well as its visual
and aural composition are bleak, yet it is at the same time, visionary, resonant, and
powerfully transformative for some viewers.5 I attribute much of the enduring
scholarly interest in this film to the way in which it functions to disrupt or destabilize a
number of our familiar, sedimented conceptual formations.6 It operates through and
against the genre of the Western, providing a powerful indictment of the violence
and greed of white America, juxtaposed with a carefully researched portrayal of
indigenous culture and language.7
In my view, Dead Man is necessary viewing, not just for legal scholars but for all of
us who as legal subjects in North America, must reconcile our juridical presuppositions
with those that existed here before us. For, when both the existing legal institutions and
the underlying narratives that stabilize and legitimate them are revealed as complicit in
the perpetuation of profound historical injustice, as with the settlement of North
America and the displacement of its indigenous populations, the need for a different
way of thinking law and politics in the west becomes only too evident. And while the
enduring role of the Western as a genre which functions to legitimate the ‘‘bringing of
law’’ to the frontier is by now well-documented in legal scholarship,8 the question of
what re-considerations of law might follow from these critical insights is a more
difficult one. How do we, in essence, re-imagine the encounter between the
indigenous populations and the settler society in North America? My suggestion in
this article is that Dead Man, as a film that leaves the western, and its concerns with
law-making and

law-breaking, behind to trace a very different sort of westward

journey taken by these

two outlaw characters, Nobody and Blake, provides the

beginning of a response.
My search for a conceptual language that could capture my intuitive sense of Dead
Man as not only a powerful tool for critique, but as a text which opens itself to
alternative ways of thinking about the encounter between white settler society and
indigenous communities in North America, led me to the work of Gilles Deleuze. For
Deleuze, the project of philosophy is the creation of concepts – concepts are both
creative and critical; as such they can play a role in the process of inventing new
possibilities for life.9
However, what follows should not be read as an exercise in Deleuzian theorizing,
but rather, following Pisters, as an experiment in working with Deleuze in the field of law
and film.10 For Pisters, ‘‘working with’’ Deleuze describes a project in which she
seeks to demonstrate, through new or unexpected encounters between Deleuze’s
‘‘toolbox of concepts, planes and assemblages’’ (p. 13) and different types of films,
from Hollywood to contemporary independent cinema ‘‘how some of his ideas can
work: What new thoughts become possible? What new emotions can I feel? What new
sensations and perceptions can be opened in the body?’’ (p. 9). My own approach is
similarly experimental and explorative, focusing on the uses to which I might put a
limited range of Deleuzian inflected concepts, rather than on a formal engagement with
his philosophy.11
‘‘Event,’’ ‘‘de-territorialization,’’ and ‘‘becoming’’ are the concepts that I explore in
the context of this consideration of Jarmusch’s strangely evocative film, in an effort to

stage a productive interval for thinking differently about modern law. Correspondingly,
the argument proceeds in three parts. Section II explains and develops the approach to
doing scholarly work at the intersection of law and film that I am taking in this article,
one that engages with the film under consideration as an ‘‘event.’’ In Section III, I
consider Dead Man’s relation to the western genre and its implications for how we
think about law’s founding on the frontier. In Section IV, I consider the transformations
undergone by the character of Blake, and in particular, explore the relationship
between Blake’s journey in the film and the radical worldview of his poetic
namesake. In the conclusion, I return to the question of legal pluralism, and consider
the extent to which it might be possible for film viewers/legal subjects in North
America to ‘‘pass through the mirror,’’12 to understand law differently.

II. The Film as Event
I have elsewhere observed that taking an affective approach to thinking about film and
its relation to law might also be described as an encounter with the film as an
event.13Encountering film in this way is distinct from the representational models
which tend to predominate in law and film scholarship and in traditional film theory.14
Those approaches might focus on the narrative of the film, or on its symbolic structure,
or in law and film scholarship, on how the law is represented in a given film, and how
that representation may or may not correspond to our experience of the law in the
‘‘real’’ world of lawyers, judges and courtrooms rather than the ‘‘virtual’’ world of
the film.15 In contrast, for Deleuze, “both the actual and the virtual are contained on

what Deleuze calls the ‘plane of immanence’. The plane of immanence contains not
just filmic images but all images relating to ‘a life’.’’16
Thinking about film as an event brings into focus the embodied and temporal
dimensions of the experience of watching, hearing, and feeling a particular film as it
unfolds in a particular time and place.17 It redirects our attention towards the
components of duration, intensity, and movement – as they are apprehended by the
individual.18 The turn, then, is from the consideration of a film on its own terms to a
consideration of what is produced in the interchange between a film and a viewer.
In terms of method, the shift moves one away from an analysis of the narrative or
representational structure of the film towards a multi-dimensional engagement with the
many ways that films can work on us, affecting our perception, reasoning and judgments
in the process.19 The composition of shots, perspective, camera angles, movement, color,
sound and music are all aspects of what might make a particular moving image affect us
in certain ways. But, although this approach requires that one attend more closely to
these matters of how a film is put together, the primary interest here lies with what Alison
Young has described as “the ways in which the cinematic image is written in time, in the
body, in sound, tactility and memory….’’20 This redirection serves to remind us that
thought is composed in the midst of embodied experience. Moreover, what is produced
in this interchange, according to Deleuze, exceeds and confounds our usual
representational conceptions of thought as cognition.

Cinema places thinking “en rapport avec un impense, l’inevocable, l’inexplicable,

l’indecidable, l’incommensurable” (L’image-temps, 279) (in relation with something outside
of thought, the

inevocable, the inexplicable, the undecidable, the incommensurable).

Suchisthecinematographic event in its maximal degree, what Deleuze calls ‘‘une mort
cerebrale agitee’’ (an agitated cerebral death) or ‘‘un nouveau cerveau qui serait a la fois
l’ecran, la pellicule et la camera”
(280) (a new brain that would be at once the screen, the film and the camera).21

While it is admittedly difficult to fully map the implications of this conception of the
cinematographic event, the remainder of this section will attempt a modest illustration of
this reorientation specifically in relation to the score of Dead Man. If films are
experienced, and not simply watched, it follows that a crucial dimension of that
experience is auditory – as we might all intuitively realize, sounds and music are
crucial to the affect of a film.22 Moreover, sound works directly on our bodies; it is a
wave, a vibration passing through us, setting up other vibrations in its wake.23 Sound
is also most directly linked to the pre-cognitive realm of affect rather than the
cognitive realm of representation; sound is what suggests to us that all is not necessarily
as it appears: “If the ideology of the visible demands that the spectator understand the
image as a truthful representation of reality, the ideology of the audible demands
that there exist simultaneously a different truth and another order of reality for the
subject to grasp.”24
In Dead Man, the score plays a significant and distinctive role in shaping our affective
encounter with the images on the screen. I will argue that it is distinctive in that the
score does not simply mirror or represent the images on the screen (or their intended

emotional valence), but rather it unfolds according to its own logic, becoming another
dimension or vector of the experience of the film, without directly corresponding to it.
The observations of the filmmaker, Jim Jarmusch, on the relations between music and
filmmaking illuminate this relation:

Music is always the most inspiring form for me; I just think music is so pure…. And I think that
there’s a very large part of filmmaking that is very musical because, like a piece of music, a film
passes before your eyes and ears in its own rhythm and time. It’s not like a painting or a
book where you can stop, and read it again, or look at a different part. You have to follow its
flow. So, there’s a connection in filmmaking to music that’s very important to me.25

Both Jarmusch’s appreciation of music as a distinct, and pure ‘‘form,’’ as well as his
attentiveness to the temporal dimensions of both film and music; the way they are
necessarily experienced as flow, are consonant with the approach to ‘‘film as event’’
that I am seeking to explore in this article. So, too, is the manner in which the score
came about. Jarmusch recounted, in another interview, that at the time he was writing
Dead Man, he was listening to a lot of Neil Young and Crazy Horse.
Serendipidously, he met Neil Young during filming in Arizona, and Young eventually
agreed to compose the score.26 It was composed primarily as an extended guitar solo,
and it was recorded live to the two and a half hour rough cut of the film, an exercise
that, according to Jarmusch, was repeated only two or three times over the course
of two days.27 Neil Young said that watching the rough cut of the film inspired him to
think about how silent movies were screened to live music. To record the score, he

had the film projected in his studio on about twenty screens, arranged in a circle, with
his instruments in the middle, so that he could watch the film as he played, walking
from one instrument to another within the circle as the scenes changed.28 These
accounts reveal an affect-driven improvisational feedback loop between Young and
Jarmusch – each of these remarkable compositions come into being through an affinity
with the other. The creative affinity between Jarmusch’s images and Young’s sounds
helps to illuminate how the ‘‘affective encounter’’ needs to be understood as and in
terms of connections and intensities, rather than representation or identities, as much
for the creators as for us, the spectators.
Various attempts have been made to describe the improvised minimalist score
itself, though its essence is difficult to capture in language. For the most part, it is a
simple ‘‘modal’’ melody based on three notes, played on reverberating electric guitar.
This theme has been described as ‘‘haunting,’’ and the effect is enhanced as it
reappears, with variations, over and over throughout the film. The remainder of the
score is performed on acoustic guitar, pump organ and detuned piano. The repetition
of the theme is periodically punctuated, or interrupted by what one critic described
as ‘‘percussive sound effects, jolts and raw sensation.”29 Another describes ‘‘flickering
microriffs full of tension and strangeness, glistening golden trails of melody that cut
abruptly to a single crunching power chord like the report of a rifle.’’30 It is
significant that throughout these variations and their punctuation, the musical theme
is never fully resolved. In this way, the music both sutures itself to the film’s affect
of dislocation and disorientation, and ventures beyond it. Greil Marcus observes that

the ‘‘music, as you listen, separates from the movie even as it frames scenes, banter,
recitals. It gets bigger and more abstract, and it becomes hard to understand how
any film, showing people doing this or that in specific, non-abstract ways, could
hold it.” And later, he notes that this abstraction takes the music into ‘‘the realm of
the secret—each must hear the music in his or her own way.’’31
Thinking about a film as an event also implies an irreducible plurality; that is, what
is significant is not the film itself, but what is produced through the multiple
encounters between this film and its viewers.32 During a screening, the sound and
images in a film are complexly layered over one another in the mind/body of the
viewer experiencing the film as something ‘‘watched, heard, felt, lived and
remembered.”33 Out of this affective relation, the spectator makes sense of the film;
and meaning is created. The experience of the event (watching the film) cannot be
reduced to a single meaning, an abstracted singularity; rather it is each viewer’s
experience of it that gives rise to a unique, even secret, opportunity to make sense of
it.34

III. De-territorializing the West/ern
Not all films, or more accurately, all experiences of seeing/hearing/feeling film,
contain a political dimension, however. An event, to be political, also needs to
encompass an element of surprise.35 Or, in the Deleuzian terminology, a political event
is an action that ‘‘counter-actualises’’: rather than affirming established meanings, it
reveals something new in the world.36 So, while political events ‘‘break into the

world as an ‘infinite improbability,’’’ political non-events include “anything that is
assigned meaning that merely accepts or reinforces established conceptions of the
political.”37 Following this line of analysis, we might observe that most Western
films made working within the conventions of the genre would be political nonevents, including many ‘‘revisionist’’ westerns, like Unforgiven.38 In contrast, Dead
Man, while using the genre as a point of departure, launches us unexpectedly into a
disorienting journey ‘‘through the mirror,’’ which, as with Alice’s looking-glass,
transports us into an entirely different world in which the usual rules do not seem to
apply.
Although Dead Man is obviously some kind of western, it’s not one of those smart homages to
a Hollywood genre (like Sam Raimi’s The Quick and the Dead) – it’s more like the ghostly
burnt out shell of a Western, commandeered for sullen and obscure purposes.39

In this way, Dead Man might be understood to work as a de-territorializing assemblage –
it pursues a ‘‘line of flight’’ that both interrupts some established patterns of thought and
reveals new affinities and connections. De-territorialization is not, here, tied literally to
the notion of territory in terms of physical demarcations of land, but is a concept that
identifies those formations that undo established or expected ways of thinking and usher
in new modes or ways of being.
Going further, one might suggest that there is a way in which Dead Man de-territorializes
not only the Western genre, but also the ‘‘West’’ understood as a particular political/legal
configuration underpinned by a unified historical narrative of the settlement of the frontier.
Dead Man radically undermines the orderly narrative of the ‘‘colonial encounter’’ in which
modern law brings civilization to formerly savage places. By juxtaposing a bleak depiction

of the lawlessness, brutality and savagery endemic to life in the frontier town of Machine at
the outset of the film with a detailed portrayal of the orderly decision-making process in a
well-established Makah village at its conclusion, Jarmusch ‘‘counter-actualizes’’ the
Western’s legal narrative. In between these key framing scenes, the journey of the
protagonists in Dead Man enacts a series of reversals of the tropes of wilderness and
civilization, citizenship and savagery that the laying down of law on the frontier is
supposed to hold in place.40 A slightly different, but sympathetic, reading has argued that
Dead Man, in its deliberate unsettling of the Western archive, performs ‘‘creative
archival violence,’’ not from outside, but from within the archive itself.41 In relation to the
western’s legal archive, I would agree. As expected, this film does provide an affirmation
of a legal order in its final scenes. Moreover, even as that order is affirmed, it is revealed
as under threat from the savagery of the other, lurking just beyond its borders. What is
radically different in Dead Man is that the threatened legal order depicted in the film is
indigenous, rather than western.
Dead Man begins conventionally enough, with our protagonist, Bill Blake, taking a
journey by rail, across a variety of increasingly wild and desolate landscapes, the steam
train indicating that we are likely in the American west, around the late 1800’s. The
shifting cast of prospectors, homesteaders, and frontiersmen on the train, also seem to
indicate that we are in a familiar western terrain. But, Dead Man is shot in a richly
textured black and white (including all possible grey tones), “almost as if color wasn’t
invented yet.” Jarmusch has stated that this was to distinguish his film from the
‘‘same dusty palette’’ that characterized most modern westerns.42 He notes also that it

was intended to achieve an experience of de-familiarization for the viewer, by
distancing us from the knowledge of objects and locations that we gain from color. The
sense of strangeness and dislocation is also in sympathy with that of the main character,
‘‘a man who has embarked on a journey that carries him further and further away from
anything familiar.’’43
In both narrative and compositional elements of the film, many of which are
established in the opening sequence, this affect of disorientation and dislocation is
reinforced. The ‘‘ragged guitar riffs’’ of the score, combined in the opening scene with
the diegetic sounds of the train wheels, the swaying motion of the train reflected in the
motion of the passengers and a swinging lamp overhead, and a slow sequence of
black and white vignettes in which the passengers surrounding the character of Blake
become increasingly rough-looking, is deeply disconcerting. Narratively as well,
the film quickly departs from convention. Our first indication that something quite
different is about to unfold is introduced by a strange visionary monologue from the
train fireman (Crispin Glover) that eerily anticipates the final scene of the film in
which Blake, near death, is being carried out to sea in a ceremonial canoe;

Look out the window. And doesn’t it remind you of when you’re in the boat, and then later that
night you’re lying, looking up at the ceiling, and the water in your head was not dissimilar
from the landscape, and you think to yourself, ‘‘Why is it that the landscape is moving, but the
boat is still?”44

Justus Nieland, in his cogent reading of the film that draws both on Derrida’s work on the
archive, and Deleuze’s work on cinema, observes that ‘‘the boiler-man’s trippy

associative chain troubles any clean distinctions between feeling and experience,
affect and event.”45 In his comment on Blake’s letter of employment, the fireman
also prefigures the film’s view of western law: “I wouldn’t trust no words written
down on no piece of paper.”46 Perhaps even more presciently for this reading of the film,
the opening exchange between Bill and the fireman is abruptly drowned out by the
sound of rifle fire – as all of the men in the train car begin indiscriminately shooting
buffalo out the window. The government-sanctioned buffalo slaughter replaces the
western mythology of law, progress and economic expansion that the train journey
typically represents with a haunting evocation of the massive slaughter of Native
Americans that took place during the historical settlement of the West.47

Figure 1. The Train Fireman enters the Carriage (image courtesy of Photofest, NYC)

As several commentators have already observed, Dead Man interrupts almost all of
the codes on which the western is based, including that which allocates “civility to

whites and savagery to Indians” in giving us a world peopled by illiterate,
cannibalistic, and violent white men, on the one hand, and a literate, humane and selfdeprecatingly humorous Indian on the other.48 But I am arguing here that the work that
this film does goes well beyond generic subversion and into another set of directions
entirely.49 It goes beyond western law, for Blake shortly discovers, as the prophetic
train engineer predicted, that there is no job waiting for him in Machine. It also
moves beyond the frontier, as Blake soon has to flee the town (which we are told is
at ‘‘the end of the line’’) a wanted man. The mis-en-scene in the frontier town of
Machine is full of signs and markers of death. As Blake walks down the muddy
main street, we see a wall of skulls, men with guns, and a busy coffin-making
operation. Blake’s walk through the streets of Machine also provides a visual point
of reference that is recalled at the end of the film when, semi-conscious and near
death, he is halfcarried down the main street of the Makah village by Nobody. In
contrast to the frontier town, the village is full of people and signs of life.
The film moves into unfamiliar terrain soon after the scene in which Thel is shot and
Blake mortally wounded by Thel’s ex-lover. After Blake uses Thel’s gun to kill Charlie
Dickinson, he steals a horse and rides out of town, becoming an outlaw. Blake
eventually passes out, and is woken, painfully, by Nobody attempting to extract the
bullet from his chest with a knife. This is the point at which the film departs from the
western’s fixation with the divide between the lawful and the lawless, and ventures into
a whole new set of concerns that might be understood as emanating from a
philosophical perspective best described as ‘‘immanent naturalism.’’50 Nobody and

Blake, traveling together, are immersed in a different world; a world of presence, as
opposed to representation, in which the boundaries between human and animal,
nature and culture are less distinct. Their journey is traced through a sequence of
vignettes set in a series of strikingly diverse wilderness landscapes, desert followed by
mountain, aspen forest replaced by massive Sequoias; the black screens separating the
scenes giving no indication of how much time or distance has intervened. As Blake,
Nobody, and the bounty hunters on Blake’s trail move through these strangely
changing landscapes, there is repetition, yet nothing feels familiar. As our linear
perceptions of clock time and cartographic space are displaced,
the viewing experience becomes not unlike an altered state of consciousness or
hallucination.51 A cyclical, rather than linear, sense of time is reinforced by the way in
which the vignettes that comprise each scene are discrete enough that it seems as if
their sequence could be shuffled without significantly affecting the film.52
So, Dead Man not only confounds the Western genre, it interposes a space within it in
which other perspectives, notably indigenous worldviews, might be enacted. And
although the film is ostensibly about Blake, it is Nobody who gives the film both
meaning and direction. Nobody is essential to Blake’s journey – both the physical
journey, as they travel together to the coast, as well as the psychic journey, the
transformations of self-perception that he undergoes along the way. In contrast with
Blake, whose blank affect is the most significant aspect of his personality, Nobody is
an emotionally variegated and complex character. He is of mixed ancestry, part Blood,
part Blackfoot53 and was kidnapped when very young, caged and put on display. He

ends up in England, where he was sent to a British school and learns to read, leading
to his discovery of the poetry of Blake. He eventually escaped and returned to the
west, but by virtue of his mixed-blood status and his contamination with white
society, he was not accepted back by his communities. He is as lost and disconnected
from his own culture as Blake. In the film, he speaks four native languages as well as
English (although all the native languages spoken in the film are accurate, they are not
subtitled).
When Blake first tells Nobody his name, Nobody reacts intensely – ‘‘You are truly a
dead man, then’’ he says. Then, Nobody’s demeanor towards Blake changes, as he has
realized that the task before him is to ‘‘deliver Blake’s misplaced spirit that has somehow
found its way into the physical realm back to the spirit level of the world.’’54 The journey
of the remainder of the film is defined by this goal; Nobody tells a weakening Blake, as
he paddles him down a river; “We must make sure that you pass back through the mirror
at a place where the sea meets the sky.” Their journey ultimately brings them to a Makah
village, on the most northwest part of the coast of the continental U.S. (the Olympic
Peninsula). The Makah traditionally hunted whales, and are well known for their
construction of sea canoes. Nobody speaks the Makah language and knows of their
seafaring reputation. He disappears inside the longhouse for a lengthy formal
meeting with the Makah elders. Although both Nobody and Blake are strangers, the
Makah agree to provide them with a sea canoe and as well as all of the ceremonial
trappings necessary for Blake’s journey, including two large twists of tobacco. For a
western legal scholar, the hospitality extended by the Makah to Nobody and Blake
evokes the right of universal hospitality formulated by Kant, but in exceeding the

juridical requirements of Kant’s formulation, it also suggests the possibility of another,
more encompassing, conception.55

Figure 2. Blake and Nobody (image courtesy of Photofest, NYC)

The gift of the tobacco encapsulates the deep connection that emerges between the
two men throughout the film. On their very first encounter, and several times
thereafter, Nobody asked Blake if he had any tobacco. Blake’s answer was always “I
don’t smoke.” In the final scene, Nobody gently places the twists of tobacco on Blake’s
chest just before pushing him off to sea, then stands up to watch Blake’s departure with
tears on his face. As Blake is picked up by the current and begins to float away, his final
words to Nobody are: “But I don’t smoke.”

While some commentators might see Nobody’s identification of Blake with the
English poet as yet another ‘‘misrecognition’’ in a film shot through with mis-firings
and misunderstandings,56 I think the film can be read differently. In this alternative
view, Nobody does indeed recognize Blake, both in his role as every-man (or in
Nobody’s words, ‘‘stupid fucking white man’’), but also in the complex hybridities of
his ‘‘becomings,’’ most significantly, his becoming William Blake, the poet. In this
reading, Nobody is both the film’s visionary and the author of its plot. In their first
encounter, Nobody quotes the poetry of William Blake to Bill, who fails to recognize
the well-known lines from Auguries of Innocence: “Every Night and every Morn/Some
to Misery are Born…/ Some are Born to sweet delight/Some are Born to Endless
Night.” Nobody also warns Blake about his gun; “That weapon will replace your
tongue. You will learn to speak through it and your poetry will now be written in
blood.” Later in the film, when Nobody meets up with Bill, and they are about to go
into a trading post in which they will kill several more white men, he quotes Blake
again, this time from Proverbs from Hell: “Drive your cart and plow over the bones
of the dead.”
It is Nobody’s hybrid worldview, rather than Blake’s tabula rasa, that animates and
gives shape and direction to the film. Jarmusch said as much when he observed that
Nobody’s ‘‘nonwestern perspective that life is an unending cycle is essential to the story
of Dead Man.’’57 It is its reorientation towards the non-western perspective that makes
Dead Man both a radically re-visioned and visionary western; a film whose westward
‘‘progress’’ is not determined by the inevitable onward march of law, civilization or

economic development, but rather an indigenous ceremony of return – ‘‘passing through
the mirror.’’ In its de-territorializing of the western genre, Dead Man traces a line of
flight away from the frontier, and from modern law’s preoccupation with the divide
between civilized and savage, and towards the possibility of different visions of law
embedded within other ways of being in the world.

IV. Blake’s Becomings
[Becoming] constitutes a zone of proximity and indiscernibility, a no-man’s land, a
nonlocalizable relation sweeping up the two distant or contiguous points, carrying one into the
proximity of the other.58

Although Nobody gives the film its meaning and direction, Blake is the character with
whom the viewer is meant to identify. The film traces his journey from its inception in
the train ride across the continent to his gradual merging with the leaden grey of the
Pacific Ocean at its conclusion. Over the course of this journey, which is also the
journey of his life, Blake is transformed in multiple ways. “Contrary to his nature,
circumstances transform Blake into a hunted outlaw, a killer, and a man whose
physical existence is slowly slipping away. Thrown into a world that is cruel and
chaotic, his eyes are opened to the fragility that defines the realm of the living. It is as
though he passes through the surface of a mirror and emerges into a previously
unknown world that exists on the other side.”59
According to Patricia Pisters, “Every becoming is a process and an attempt to think

differently, to see or feel something new in experience by entering into a zone of
proximity with somebody or something else.”60 In this unknown realm, the gentle
and naïve young Bill is launched into an accelerated process of becoming. He is
transected and transformed by energies and forces in the unfamiliar world he now
inhabits; he becomes part of the violent world of action: a wanted man, tracked by
bounty hunters, his actions

become instinctive. He becomes a ‘‘killer of white

men,” even if most of those he kills have first tried to kill him. Through his travels
with Nobody, he encounters an indigenous worldview and indigenous society, and is
marked by Nobody as a native warrior. He is also fully immersed within the natural
world, as he travels, sleeps and eats outside. Justus Nieland sums it up as follows:

Blake is a complex stratification of marks: not just the white record of Western violence, he is
marked by Nobody as a native warrior, and, by his own hand, with the blood of a slain fawn.
Locating Blake both inside the Western cultural archive and inside nature, coding him as
variously Indian and white, human and animal, animate and inanimate, Jarmusch transforms
his protagonist into a transcendent site of becoming.61

While I don’t agree with Nieland about the nature of these becomings (I will argue below
that they are reflective of a shift into an ‘‘immanent’’ rather than ‘‘transcendent’’
worldview), I do agree that Jarmusch has given us in Blake’s journey a fascinating
meditation on life as becoming. Although a number of becomings can be traced
through the film,62 the trajectory that is of particular interest to the analysis here is his
becoming William Blake.

1 Becoming William Blake
According to Deleuze, the freedom of becoming happens to “someone who has moved
into an alternate universe where things are measured differently, valued differently and
generally held together by an entirely fresh set of rules.”63 Although he had never
heard of the poet, and is initially confused by the lines quoted to him by Nobody, Bill
Blake eventually opens up to the energies/possibilities presented by the ‘‘other’’ William
Blake. In a later scene where he is confronted in his camp by two sheriffs who have
come to kill him, one asks, “Are you William Blake?’’ And he answers, ‘‘yes I am, do
you know my poetry?’’ before killing them both. William Blake of Cleveland seems to
matter less and less as the film goes on, even as the wanted posters with his image
proliferate.
The letting go of his own identity and ego that is part of what happens to Blake on his
journey in this film resonates with a passage from Deleuze quoted by Pisters in her
concluding chapter:

It’s a strange business, speaking for yourself in your own name, because it doesn’t at all come
with seeing yourself as an ego, or a person, or a subject. Individuals find a real name for themselves
rather, only through the harshest exercise in depersonalization, by ‘‘opening’’ themselves up to
the multiplicities everywhere within them, to the intensities running through them.64

Figure 3. “Do You Know my Poetry?” (image courtesy of Photofest, NYC)

Rather than disabling and/or distancing him from events in the world, the mortal wound
to the heart that Blake receives at the outset of the film (which literally ‘‘opens him up’’)
propel him into a life of action. Meek and bookish in the early scenes, on the run, he is
confident, his actions fluid. Through the journey to the coast, as blood slowly seeps out
of his chest, (the wound never closes, though Nobody makes an attempt to cauterize it
early) it is as if he obtains energy from outside of himself, that is, from ‘‘intensities
running through him.’’
The dark visionary sensibility of the poet William Blake becomes one of the forces or
intensities that runs through Blake in the film.65 The poet Blake, during his lifetime,

might also be described as a ‘‘cultural orphan.’’ His art did not make him wealthy or
famous and he rejected most of the prevalent belief systems of his time in favor of
developing his own philosophical system.66 Although Blake frequently experienced
visions and is often described as a mystic, his approach was not otherworldly. Blake, for
example, thought that Christianity encouraged the suppression of natural desires and
discouraged earthly joy.67 He criticizes “bibles and sacred codes” for being the source
of the erroneous belief that man’s existence is somehow divided between body and
soul, and that reason, the good, derives from the soul whereas the baser evil energies
come from the body. On the positive side, Blake believed that man had no body
distinct from the soul, that energy is the only life and comes from the body, and that
reason is the outward circumference of this energy.
The Spinozist elements in Blake’s thought illuminate a radically distinctive way of
viewing the world that can be understood as disruptive of the basic parameters of ‘‘the
universal empire” of modernity: “the political culture, the forms of narrative and
representation, the modes of subjectivity and temporality, the forms of production and
exchanges which it simultaneously presupposes and enables.”68 Although Blake
identified with and to some extent, used the language of the antinomianism of the
1790’s in England, Makisi argues that he distinguishes himself from Paine and others
in that his critique extended beyond the state, to both the form of law and of legal
subjects.

Whereas much of the radical struggle for liberty in the 1790’s was aimed exclusively at the

apparatuses of the state, Blake’s challenge to tyranny requires a social, economic and
cultural dimension as well, and recognizes that a struggle for freedom must go beyond
the strictly political-representational issues raised in the writings of activists like Paine, to
challenge not only the forms of identity taken for granted by Paine, but also the radical faith
in the law and competition.69

In particular, Blake’s conception of the individual differed quite radically from those of
his fellow antinomians; for Blake, “all forms of being involve an immanent sharing,
an ongoing dynamic re-articulation of the minute particulars making us who we are. It
is in this sense that we can be understood to exist in, and as, a dynamic, regenerating
network of relations, a unity of minute particulars, some or all of which may at different
times be shared with others, rather than static hardened selfhoods, as ever-changing
composites rather than a stream of interchangeable monads….”70 This way of
thinking resonates with the Spinozist/Deleuzian notion of ‘‘becoming’’ as a life of
affects, connections, and energies. We can understand William Blake, then, both as a
radical critic of the representational language of modernity, but also as the creator,
through his engraved books, of an alternative “mode of life and being, a culture, that
remains inadmissible to modernity and to the history of the possible.”71 And his appeal
for Nobody, the displaced, mixed-blood Indian child, becomes recognizable.
Just as Blake himself has mystified generations of critics, however, the Blakean themes
running through the film can be misleading for viewers. For example, from the opening
exchange with the train fireman, there are repeated references to Hell throughout the film,
and the character Blake comes to accept it as his destiny as he also accepts his poetic

namesake. This acceptance is illustrated in his encounter with the missionary, later in the
film, who when he is about to be shot, asks God to damn Blake’s soul “to the fires of
Hell.” Blake’s response, ‘‘he already has,’’ reveals his acceptance of the destiny that had
been foretold by the train fireman. Hell, for Blake and the missionary, however, may not
mean the same thing. At least, for William Blake the poet (and it would seem the outlaw
as well), Hell is a domain of rich creative energies. William Blake was a fierce critic of
religious orthodoxy, and in his poem ‘‘The Marriage of Heaven and Hell,’’ he mocks the
conventional doctrines of a torturing and torturous hell and an empty orderly heaven. The
creative inferno is to be preferred to that which society values as cautious and prudent and
morally good. In the place of society’s false opposition of good and evil, Blake predicts a
coming union of heat and light, the marriage of heaven and hell which promises no less
than freedom for the creative energy of prophets and visionaries.
Although there are moments when one might be tempted to read it otherwise (the long
painful walk through the native town at the end of the film is one instance) I have been
arguing in this article that the other side of the mirror reflected in Dead Man is not some
other, transcendent plane of existence, but rather an exploration of the immediacy of
lived experience, the immanent possibilities of life. We can trace this immanent strand
through the affective alliance with the poet William Blake, whose belief in the creative
possibilities of being animated a worldview that stood apart from the emerging
modernity of the society in which he lived and worked.

V. Conclusion: Immanent Legalities
This article has journeyed through a considerable amount of unfamiliar terrain for most
legal scholars; yet it has been propelled by a quest to understand the encounter between
modern law as it has come to be understood in the west, and other possible understandings
of law, such as those encompassed within the various worldviews of North America’s
indigenous populations. Modern law is the law of the sovereign – it attributes to the state
those transcendent capabilities that had formerly been invested in kings, who themselves
were understood as deriving authority from God.72 As such, it must be all-encompassing;
it cannot abide with the possibility that other, equally authoritative legal orders might
coexist alongside it. That modern law is necessarily understood as transcendent and
hence, all-encompassing, presents the most serious obstacle to the recognition of
other, most notably indigenous, legal orders in the west.73 And although this article has
been animated by this concern, I have not sought to further critiques of modern law in
the preceding pages. That work has already been done by others. Rather, my question
has been: what would it take for us, as modern legal subjects, to ‘‘pass through the
mirror’’ and become able to imagine law otherwise?
I have suggested Jim Jarmusch’s disturbing film Dead Man as a useful instrument for
this experiment in thinking law otherwise. As I explain in the first section of the article,
attempts to think differently have an important affective dimension. That is, thought is
not purely a cognitive process, but rather is embodied, influenced and shaped through
experience. The experience of ‘‘watching’’ (hearing, feeling, sensing) a film then, is an
event which can have important resonances within our (legal and political) sensibilities –

either reinforcing established belief systems (as the western genre tends to do) or in
creating a space for other ways of thinking to emerge. In the second part of the paper, I
argue that Dead Man, in its possession and radical transformation of the genre of the
Western, does the latter. That is, it displaces the Western’s fascination with the divides
between ‘‘civilized’’ and ‘‘savage’’ and the function of law in stabilizing those
boundaries on the frontier. Moreover, in their place, it locates a different conception of
law, one that is connected to another worldview – encompassing within it both a
cyclical understanding of life and death and a conception of time as duration or
becoming, rather than empty homogenous time, the time of capital. The westward
journey of Dead Man is driven, not by the dictates of progress or economic gain, but by
Nobody’s quest to enable Blake to ‘‘pass through the mirror’’ on the Pacific. Finally, in
tracing Blake’s becomings in the film, I argue that we can begin to discern the nature
of the process that we might need to undergo in order to be able to imagine law in
another way. Through an understanding of becoming as both a ‘‘zone of proximity’’
and an ‘‘opening up,’’ we might glean how one could utilize the affective encounter
with a film such as Dead Man to catalyze the process of thinking law differently. By
drawing us into an affective proximity with the thought of the poet William Blake,
who resisted modernity at the very moment of its emergence, we are led to a more
fulsome appreciation of how it might be possible to imagine alternatives to our own
representational understandings of modern law and of ourselves as its subjects.
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